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Fredriksson D. Moving targets: Target groups of active labour 
market policies and transitions to employment in Europe
This study drew on recurrent debates related to labour market 
mobility among the unemployed and those outside the labour 
force and asked to what extent active labour market policies 
(ALMP) increase employment in these two groups. By utilis-
ing new programme-level data on ALMP, the study analysed 
the impact of core programmes directed towards registered 
unemployed; peripheral programmes that target the inactive 
part of the working age population; and mixed programmes 
targeting both groups. The programme data were combined 
with individual-level panel data from the European Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions and analysed using mul-
tilevel analysis. The main results show that both resources 
devoted to programmes and their size were related to em-
ployment transitions. Transitions among the unemployed 
were mainly associated with spending on core programmes, 
whereas the inactive seemed to benefit from increased spend-
ing on all types of programmes, as well as increased scope of 
mixed programmes.
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For a good part of recent decades, the European Union 
(EU) has promoted the idea of active inclusion, which 
is defined as enabling citizens, particularly the dis-
advantaged, to fully participate in society (European 
Commission, 2008). To achieve this, the EU has for-
mulated the targets related to the performance of 
European labour markets and in the most recent plan 
for European economic and social development – the 
Horizon 2020 growth strategy – one headline target 
states that 75% of the working age population in the 
EU should be employed by 2020. A central element in 
the EU’s strategy for attaining this target is implemen-
tation of active labour market policies (ALMPs). The 
most recent figures from Eurostat show an average em-
ployment rate of 72% (Eurostat, 2018), but with con-
siderable variation across countries, which indicates 
that more effective efforts may be needed to activate 
the citizens and help them into employment.
Most research concerning the impact of ALMPs fo-
cuses either on the programme content (e.g., employ-
ment or training) or on the demographic characteristics 
of programme participants (e.g., youth or immigrants) 
(Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2010; Kluve, 2010; Lechner & 
Wunsch, 2009). While these are important dimensions, 
they neglect that ALMPs may also target individuals 
according to their labour force status (Cronert, 2019). 
For the unemployed, governments typically aim to in-
crease the likelihood of unemployed persons finding 
employment as quickly as possible. With respect to 
the inactive part of the population, policies can sup-
port individuals to become at least active participants 
of the labour force and subsequently find employment 
(Mailand, 2008).
The distinction between the unemployed and 
the inactive reflects an older academic debate as to 
whether labour market mobility among unemployed 
and those outside the labour force differs signifi-
cantly, and whether it is justified to talk about two 
distinct groups (e.g., Flinn & Heckman, 1983). The 
prevailing conclusion in the literature is that this is 
indeed the case (for recent examples, see: Eichhorst, 
Konle-Seidl, Koslowski, & Marx, 2011; Jones & 
Riddell, 2017). From a policy perspective, it would 
consequently seem obvious that ALMPs should be 
designed to target each group separately. Yet, analyses 
of the impact ALMPs may have in relation to the em-
ployment chances of these two distinct target groups 
are rarely performed. The purpose of this study was 
to investigate the relationship between ALMPs and 
transitions into employment among the unemployed 
and inactive. Do ALMPs such as training, subsidised 
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employment and job creation have different employ-
ment effects once we consider that programmes may 
also target groups that have different labour market 
positions?
Answering this question can provide information 
necessary to reach the employment target set out in 
the 2020 growth strategy. Which strategies should 
countries pursue in the design of their ALMPs? If 
there are marked differences in employment effects 
across groups, should the member states, for exam-
ple, focus their ALMP efforts towards the group that 
is lagging behind or the group that seems to bene-
fit more? Similarly, should member states focus on 
a particular type of intervention, such as subsidised 
employment, for the inactive, but other interventions, 
such as training, for the unemployed? Although such 
policy priorities are important given that govern-
ments have limited resources, these questions have 
rarely been asked.
The relationship between employment transitions 
and ALMP was analysed utilising a new policy level 
data set that includes the detailed information related 
to target groups and the structure of most national and 
regional labour market programmes in the EU since 
1998. The programme level data set was combined 
with panel data from the EU Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) which contains 
individual-level information regarding labour market 
status and other characteristics of citizens residing 
in the EU. The data were analysed using multilevel 
analysis.
The article begins by discussing how ALMPs can 
be delineated according to different target groups. The 
subsequent sections focus on data and introduce some 
methodological considerations. The penultimate sec-
tion presents the results. The article concludes with a 
discussion of the main findings.
Target groups and types of ALMPs
ALMPs have several different dimensions; for ex-
ample, who they target, how many participants the 
programme encompasses, how participation is remu-
nerated and what type of intervention they involve. 
Countries may also target their policies using criteria 
such as age, gender and family status of programme 
participants (Kluve, 2010). However, programmes can 
also focus on broader target groups such as inactive or 
unemployed citizens.
If we regard unemployment and inactivity as 
the two main distinctions of labour force statuses 
around which ALMPs are organised, we can distin-
guish three possible combinations of programmes: 
programmes targeting the unemployed, the inac-
tive, or both groups (Cronert, 2019). In this study, 
these were labelled ‘core’, ‘peripheral’, and ‘mixed’ 
programmes, respectively. Within each broad classi-
fication, we can further distinguish between the type 
of intervention involved, i.e., training or job creation. 
This enables us to analyse whether some types of in-
terventions have more favourable outcomes for cer-
tain groups.
Core programmes and the unemployed
Core programmes can be defined as labour market in-
terventions available for registered unemployed, and 
should mostly affect the employment chances in this 
group. The unemployed are typically expected to be 
closer to securing a job than are the inactive. With that 
said, there is substantial variation in the group of unem-
ployed, where, for example, long-term unemployment 
is associated with ‘scarring’ effects and a decreasing 
likelihood of transition to employment due to, for ex-
ample, negative signalling of longer unemployment 
spells (Cockx & Picchio, 2013; Strandh & Nordlund, 
2008). In cases where unemployed individuals do not 
find employment, they might also become ‘discour-
aged workers’, and thus undergo a transition from 
unemployment to inactivity (Jones & Riddell, 2006). 
Here, labour market policies have been shown to re-
duce the discouraged worker effect and retain the un-
employed in the labour force (Johansson, 2001). Core 
programmes that target the registered unemployed are 
the most common design of labour market programmes 
in the European context and are generally found in all 
countries.
There is considerable variation of programmes in 
the EU, both within and across countries. Some are 
general and extensive in scope, while others may en-
compass only narrowly defined groups of unemployed 
and have comparatively few participants. While there 
is no space to recount the wide variety of programmes 
that exist across the EU, most programmes still fall 
into the familiar categories of training or employ-
ment programmes. Training schemes are supposed to 
increase employment chances by imbuing individu-
als with new and desirable skills. Employment pro-
grammes can, in turn, be divided into employment 
subsidies and job creation, where the former refer to 
various types of wage subsidies provided to employ-
ers when recruiting programme participants, and the 
latter encompasses publicly funded jobs (European 
Commission, 2017).
Peripheral programmes and the inactive
The pathway to employment is arguably less straight-
forward for inactive individuals than for the unem-
ployed. As a group, the inactive are more heterogeneous 
compared with the unemployed, and even if this im-
plies that some inactive individuals might be closer to 
the labour market, the inactive generally have lower 
transition rates to employment than the unemployed 
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(Eichhorst et al., 2011) and are most often in need of 
more support to find employment (Carcillo & Grubb, 
2006).
Peripheral programmes focus on individuals po-
sitioned outside or on the border of the labour force, 
i.e., the periphery (Halleröd, Ekbrand, & Bengtsson, 
2015; Jones & Riddell, 2006). Yet, they do come in 
similar forms as core programmes, and there are pe-
ripheral training schemes and employment subsidies 
also in this category. One exception is that there are no 
job creation schemes that target only the inactive part 
of the working age population. Not every European 
country has programmes that specifically target the 
inactive. More so than core and mixed policies, pe-
ripheral programmes are designed to address the sit-
uation of specific sub-groups of the target population, 
such as inactive women in countries with low levels 
of female labour force participation (Rubery, Smith, 
Anxo, & Flood, 2001). Other groups that peripheral 
programmes often aim to reach are individuals with 
disabilities, where policies may be designed to pro-
vide work experience through internships in regular 
workplaces or various forms of sheltered employment 
(European Commission, 2017).
Mixed programmes and encompassing policies
Mixed programmes cater both to the unemployed and 
to the inactive, and hence are available to both groups. 
Thus, mixed programmes aim to increase the employ-
ment chances of participants, regardless of activity sta-
tus. Mixed programmes also come in various forms, 
such as training schemes, employment subsidies and 
job creation programmes. By explicitly providing ac-
cess for the inactive as well as the unemployed, mixed 
programmes may signify a more encompassing policy 
agenda, but can also reflect differences across countries 
with respect to how the needs of the unemployed and 
the inactive are assessed. Some countries could thus 
organise ALMPs from the perspective that the needs 
of the unemployed are different from those of the inac-
tive, whereas other countries identify similar needs and 
thus provide the same programmes for both groups, 
i.e., mixed programmes. Mixed programmes are fairly 
common across the EU, albeit not to the same extent as 
core programmes (European Commission, 2017). The 
overall composition among core, peripheral and mixed 
programmes can be seen in Table 1, further on in the 
text.
Data and measurement
Labour market programme data
This study drew on institutional indicators of labour 
market policies from the EU (European Commission, 
2017; Eurostat, 2013), which is a relatively new data 
set containing information on most labour market 
programmes in the EU Member States and Norway 
since 1998. The data are a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative indicators collected from national gov-
ernments where information is available for specific 
labour market programmes on a yearly basis. In total, 
between 1998 and 2013, there were approximately 
1,000 different ALMP programmes in the data. The 
quantitative part of the data is used to construct the fre-
quently used aggregate ALMP expenditure measures in 
Eurostat, covering a range of interventions. The disag-
gregated analyses focus on training, direct job creation 
and employment subsidies.1 For each programme there 
are descriptions of programme type, for example train-
ing, as well as spending and the number of participants. 
The qualitative indicators are, however, what set the 
data apart as they allow categorisation of programmes 
not only in terms of content, but also whether these in-
terventions target the unemployed or the inactive, or 
what is called ‘operational target groups’.
The operational target groups consist of four main 
categories, registered unemployed, other registered 
jobseekers, not registered and employed. Registered 
unemployed refers to programmes aimed at ‘persons 
considered as registered unemployed according to 
national definitions’. Other registered jobseekers 
refer to interventions that target ‘all persons regis-
tered with the public employment services (PES) as 
jobseekers but who are not considered as registered 
unemployed according to national definitions’. Not 
registered indicates ‘interventions targeted at groups 
who are not in employment or where registration 
with the PES is not a prerequisite for participation’. 
Employed indicates that an intervention is targeted 
specifically at persons who are already in employ-
ment (Eurostat, 2013, p. 45).
I utilised the information on operational target 
groups to designate programmes that target the group 
of registered unemployed as core programmes and 
programmes that target other registered jobseekers, 
or those not registered as peripheral programmes as 
these are assumed to target mainly the inactive. The 
mixed category includes programmes that target the 
registered unemployed and one or both of the two 
target groups ‘other registered jobseekers’ or those 
‘not registered’.
In principle, there should be qualitative differ-
ences between jobseekers and registered unemployed 
in the programme data, where jobseekers are defined 
as ‘inactive’ since they are not considered registered 
unemployed (Eurostat, 2013). However, it should be 
acknowledged that there were some indications of 
1 Other interventions commonly counted as ALMP include, 
for example, public employment services (PES), but the pro-
gramme-level information related to PES was not sufficiently 
detailed to include in disaggregated analyses. For more compre-
hensive information, see Eurostat (2013).
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overlap between classifications, especially concern-
ing core and mixed policies. As noted, the opera-
tional target group for each intervention is defined, 
but there are also detailed descriptions of each in-
tervention. Here, some programme descriptions dis-
cuss jobseekers in relation to programmes that are 
denoted as targeting only the registered unemployed, 
that is, programmes that are, therefore, classified as 
core programmes. This may have implications for in-
terpreting the results since inactive individuals could 
potentially participate in some core programmes. 
It has been difficult to apply alternative classifi-
cations, that is, such as mixed, for programmes to 
which this applies because of the different formats of 
programme descriptions across countries and years. 
Any alternative coding must here be done manually, 
which has proved cumbersome due to the large num-
ber of programmes. I return to this issue in the em-
pirical analysis.
After categorisation of all programmes, I created 
three sets of independent variables. First, average 
spending per programme participant measured in 
2019 euros adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) for each target category (core, peripheral 
and mixed) was calculated and aggregated into av-
erage annual spending per participant. However, 
since utilising the aggregates of average spending 
may obscure programmes with high spending and 
low number of participants or vice versa, median 
expenditure per participant was also calculated. An 
additional problem of using spending is that high 
spending can reflect inefficiencies in programme im-
plementation or be driven by small programme sizes. 
A complementary proxy for ALMP effort is, hence, 
to disregard spending altogether, and instead focus 
on the number of individuals involved in the pro-
grammes, or what can be called the ‘scope’ or avail-
ability of programmes (Cronert, 2019). The third set 
of independent variables was, therefore, measured 
as average participant ratios, where the number of 
participants from the programme data were divided 
by the total number of unemployed individuals and 
of inactive individuals, gathered from Armingeon et 
al. (2018). Subsequently, a distinction was made be-
tween content of policy, that is, training, job creation 
and employment subsidies, for each target category. 
The overall categories constituted more observations 
than when separated by type of intervention, as there 
were some programmes that combined, for example, 
training and employment subsidies. To avoid count-
ing such programmes twice, these were excluded 
when modelling the effects according to programme 
content. Since spending is right-skewed, and to re-
duce the influence of outliers, I took the natural log 
of annual spending when entering spending variables 
into the empirical models.
Table 1 shows averages between 2003 and 2013 for 
the three sets of independent variables, as well as the 
average number of programmes. In most descriptions 
of ALMP effort, spending patterns according to wel-
fare regimes are often observed, with high-spending 
Nordic welfare states, low-spending liberal welfare 
states and the continental European welfare states 
somewhere in between (e.g., OECD, 2007; Weishaupt, 
2011). When adjusting spending for PPPs, such welfare 
regime patterns are less obvious. There is consider-
able variation across countries and ostensible regimes, 
with median expenditure typically being lower than 
the average expenditure. What is evident, however, 
is that countries have chosen different approaches re-
garding which groups to be targeted by ALMPs. The 
presence of peripheral programmes is, with some ex-
ceptions, observed mostly in Nordic countries. This 
could be an indication of a higher ambition of policies 
in that peripheral programmes seek to address the sit-
uation for the groups furthest from the labour market. 
However, there are also some unexpected countries, 
for example Cyprus and Lithuania, which have very 
high spending per participant on peripheral policies. 
As noted above, this could, to some extent, be driven 
by small programme size, which is indicated by low 
participant ratios and low number of peripheral pro-
grammes in these cases. However, the lack of periph-
eral programmes may also indicate that classification 
of such programmes is less precise. Since it is diffi-
cult to determine if that is the case, results related to 
this category should be interpreted more cautiously. It 
should also be noted that Table 1 shows averages for 
the period under analysis, 2003–2013, which obscures 
changes over time.
A deficiency difficult to overcome is that the 
programme data do not cover local, i.e., municipal, 
ALMPs. Such programmes may be an important fac-
tor in countries that implement ALMPs mainly at the 
municipal level, which typically is more common in 
relation to social assistance recipients. While the cri-
teria for income support can differ across countries, 
individuals claiming social assistance benefits are 
typically required to be registered with the PES to 
be able to receive income support. This might con-
sequently be less of a problem in this study as these 
individuals are, therefore, considered registered un-
employed (Borghi & Van Berkel, 2007; Eichhorst 
et al., 2011).
Individual-level data
The labour market programme data were combined 
with longitudinal panel data from the EU-SILC.2 The 
2 The use of EU-SILC for this study was approved by the 
Committee on Statistical Confidentiality. Contract number: 
84/2016-EU-SILC.
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longitudinal panels have a 4-year rotating structure 
where individuals and households are, at most, in the 
sample for 4 years. This means that individuals that en-
tered the survey in 2003 were observed until they ex-
ited the survey in 2006, entrants in 2004 were observed 
until 2007, and so on. I used all panels from 2003 to 
2013, and analysed individuals who had participated in 
at least three waves.3
I analysed unemployed and inactive individuals of 
‘primary’ working age (25–55), thus excluding students 
and individuals closer to retirement. In total, I analysed 
approximately 150,000 respondents. Overall household 
response rates were fairly similar across panels, al-
though with a slight decrease over the years. In 2010, 
the average response rate was approximately 82%, with 
Denmark having the lowest response rate (37%) and 
Romania the highest (96%) (Eurostat, 2012).4 
Longitudinal response rates were, unfortunately, not 
possible to calculate as the necessary information is not 
available in the data disseminated to researchers by 
Eurostat (see Verma, Betti, & Gagliardi, 2010).
The dependent variable was defined as making a 
transition from unemployment or inactivity to employ-
ment (which also included part-time employment). 
Activity status was self-reported and respondents were 
asked to give their monthly main activity during the 
last year from a set of alternatives. Unemployment 
was represented by one alternative: ‘unemployed’. It 
should be noted that this differed from the classifica-
tion of the macro-level policy data, which are based 
on registered unemployment. Up until 2009, inactivity 
was represented by a single response alternative ‘inac-
tive’, which subsequently has become more detailed. 
Currently, inactivity can be divided into disabled, in-
active due to domestic responsibilities and inactive for 
other reasons. However, since these more detailed al-
ternatives are available only for later years, they were 
combined into one inactive category. The data were 
then transformed from yearly to discrete time-format 
(person-months). Individual characteristics included in 
the empirical analyses were: age, gender, family type 
(single, two-parent family with children, single par-
ent, cohabitating couple without children), and highest 
level of attained education (primary, secondary, ter-
tiary). Duration in inactivity and/or unemployment was 
also included, as well as a squared term for duration in 
order to capture duration dependency. While there is no 
space to recount all differences between groups across 
countries, some differences between the unemployed 
and the inactive are notable. Women are clearly over-
represented among the inactive in all countries, and in 
terms of duration, the inactive typically have consider-
ably higher duration compared with the unemployed. 
Descriptive statistics related to individual characteris-
tics in the sample are available in the Online Appendix, 
Table A2.
In addition to the individual-level data and the 
macro-level policy data, the analyses also included 
macro-level controls. Each model included the un-
employment rate and GDP growth to capture dif-
ferences in business cycle fluctuations and changes 
in economic development. Spending on family pol-
icy at the national level was also included in that 
controlling for spending on family policy may be 
important due to its role in activating especially in-
active women. All control variables were collected 
from the Comparative Political Data Set 1960–2016 
(Armingeon et al., 2018).
Methods of analysis
As described above, the outcome is the transition to em-
ployment from either unemployment or inactivity. Since 
there was no individual-level information concerning 
participation in ALMPs, the primary ambition of this 
study was not causal interpretation of effects for par-
ticular individuals, but rather an examination of associa-
tions between patterns of labour market policy effort at 
the country level (devoted to specific target groups) and 
the probability of individual transitions to employment 
from unemployment and inactivity at the micro-level 
across a large number of European countries.
The data were hierarchically structured, with per-
son-months nested within individuals nested in coun-
try-years. The multilevel structure of the data was 
likely to produce a bias in both estimates and stan-
dard errors, and to account for this bias a mixed ef-
fects model with random intercepts at the country-year 
and person-level was estimated. Nesting within 
country-years (instead of within countries) partly ad-
dresses the problem of having too few countries at 
the highest level, which otherwise tends to produce 
large standard errors and confidence intervals for the 
included macro-level variables (Bryan & Jenkins, 
2016). To account for potential time trends, year 
fixed effects were added (Fairbrother, 2014). I esti-
mated linear probability models rather than logistic 
models for improved interpretability and computa-
tional efficiency (Mood, 2010). Subsequent models 
introduced random slopes of macro-level policy vari-
ables, thus allowing coefficients to differ across 
countries.5 As cross-level interactions with labour 
3 Individuals are, consequently, retained in the sample for 3 to 
4 years, and censored at the end of the observation window.
4 Average response rates between 2006 and 2013 are available 
in the Online Appendix, Table A1.
5 I was unable to include the longitudinal weights available in 
EU-SILC when using the mixed multilevel package in Stata 
V.15. These weights adjust for initial non-response and attrition 
during follow-up. Consequently, the results should be inter-
preted cautiously.
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force status was performed, a random slope for la-
bour force status was included at the individual level 
(Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019).6
The multilevel nature of the data could also be ac-
counted for using cluster robust standard errors, which 
are consistent also in the presence of in-group correla-
tions (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016; Kaminska & Wulfgramm, 
2019). However, there were also repeated events in the 
data, where over 12% of the sample experienced two or 
more transitions to employment. To avoid selection ef-
fects, the estimation should, therefore, account for the 
fact that individuals can experience several events, and 
that individuals reside in different contexts. As there 
is no reliable way to simultaneously account for both 
country and within-individual correlation with cluster 
robust standard errors, it reinforced the choice to model 
these potential correlations using random intercepts 
and coefficients.
Another selection issue was the lack of full informa-
tion related to previous experiences of the event. Since 
the EU-SILC panel data contain few retrospective 
questions, there were many cases of truncation, that is, 
people entering the study who were already unem-
ployed or inactive. For these individuals, the first spell 
was not used in the analysis as there was no informa-
tion available to determine its duration. With respect to 
left-censoring, the selection that might occur due to 
common characteristics among those with unobserved 
transitions was difficult to address since there are no 
comprehensive employment histories in EU-SILC. 
This is typically solved by estimating two-stage 
Heckman sample selection models (Heckman, 1979; 
Marx, Vandenbroucke, & Verbist, 2012). However, the 
two-stage approach requires valid predictors for selec-
tion as these should preferably be different from those 
used to predict the outcome in the second stage, which 
was not possible within the context of EU-SILC 
(Bushway, Johnson, & Slocum, 2007).7
Results
To examine the link between ALMPs and employ-
ment transitions, I estimated a series of mixed multi-
level linear probability models. Table 2 reports results 
for core peripheral and mixed programmes measured 
in three different ways, i.e., average spending per 
participant, median spending per participant, and the 
participant ratio. Subsequently, I also analysed the 
6 The multilevel models converged when covariance struc-
tures were constrained at the individual level, which suggested 
low variance (Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019, p. 295). Since the re-
sults were very similar to those without an individual-level ran-
dom slope, the more parsimonious results are reported.
7 Including left-censored individuals, and the first spell yielded 
similar results to the main results in terms of direction of effects 
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specific content of policies – training, employment 
subsidy, job creation – as well as analyses for men 
and women separately. Since the estimates are based 
on linear probability models, they can be interpreted 
as percentage point change in probability. However, 
while a positive coefficient of, for example, 0.01 
thus indicates that the chance of transitioning to em-
ployment increases with one percentage point for 
each unit increase in the independent variables, a 
strictly linear interpretation of the estimates should 
be avoided since the independent variables might not 
vary in a linear fashion (Mood, 2010). The analyses 
thus emphasised the direction of the association, and 
not the exact point estimates.
The first three models in Table 2 include average 
spending on core, peripheral and mixed programmes.8 
In all models, the negative coefficients associated 
with labour force status implies that the chance of 
transitioning to employment from inactivity was 
clearly lower in comparison with unemployed per-
sons. The positive coefficient associated with core 
programmes indicates that higher level of spending 
was related to greater probability of transitioning to 
employment. Increased spending on peripheral pro-
grammes, in contrast, seemed to reduce the probabil-
ity of transitioning into employment, but was not 
statistically significant. Mixed policies seemed to 
have similar effects as core policies, but this was not 
statistically significant at conventional thresholds. 
Coefficients related to macro- and individual-level 
variables are not shown, but are available in the 
Online Appendix, Table A3.9
However, spending on policies with different tar-
get groups should also be considered in relation to the 
labour market position, i.e., whether individuals are 
transitioning from unemployment or inactivity, and 
how these groups are affected by the policies primar-
ily targeted towards them. This relationship is captured 
in interaction terms between labour market position 
and policy. Again, the reference category is the un-
employed, so the coefficients associated with the in-
teraction express the chances of transitioning for the 
inactive compared with the unemployed. To ease in-
terpretation of these estimates, I plotted, in Figure 1, 
the predicted linear probabilities at different levels of 
logged spending per participant core, peripheral, and 
mixed programmes, respectively. All other variables 
were considered as observed. The range of spending 
was chosen according to the variation in the sample, 
from zero to maximum. It should be noted that the 
scale of logged spending is labelled according to its 
corresponding level in the figure, and that the scale is 
not evenly spaced due to log-transformations.
For the unemployed, it was primarily increased 
spending on core policies that seemed to increase the 
8 The coefficients associated with core, peripheral and mixed, 
and their significance levels, did not change substantially when 
included separately or paired.
9 It can briefly be noted that women, for example, have a lower 
chance of transitioning to employment compared with men. 
There were also signs of negative duration dependence, where 
the positive coefficient related to duration in unemployment or 
inactivity was offset by the negative coefficient related to the 
quadratic term for duration.
Figure 1. Predicted linear probability of transitioning to employment at different levels of average spending on core, peripheral and mixed 
programmes.  
Note: All marginal effects are statistically significant at the 95%-level.
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chance of transitioning into employment. However, 
the marginal effects seen in Figure 1 indicate that 
mixed policies were statistically associated with 
increased probability to transition to employment, 
whereas increased spending on peripheral policies 
reduced the transition probability. The inactive had, 
as expected, lower transition probabilities than the 
unemployed, but the policy pattern was different. 
Increased spending on mixed and peripheral pol-
icies was associated with an increase in the proba-
bility. However, increased spending on core policies 
seemed to have an even stronger effect on the chance 
of transitioning among the inactive, even though they 
were not the target group of these policies. The result 
was somewhat counterintuitive and something I re-
turn to below.
In an effort to control for influential programmes 
that had either a very high spending and a low number 
of participants or vice versa, spending in terms of me-
dian spending per participant was analysed in Models 
4 to 6. The results for median spending were similar to 
average spending. The main difference was that the co-
efficient related to mixed programmes was statistically 
significant. However, the coefficients related to the in-
teraction between labour market position and median 
spending were virtually identical to average spending 
(the corresponding figure is not shown).
The last three models in Table 2 utilised the scope 
of programmes measured as participants in pro-
grammes divided by the total number of unemployed 
individuals and of inactive individuals. This provided 
a complementary perspective since spending may be 
inherently driven by implementation issues or small 
programme sizes. When considering the main effects 
of the number of participants in core, peripheral and 
mixed programmes, the results indicated no relation-
ship between participant ratios and transition probabil-
ities. To show how effects of participant ratios differed 
according to labour market positions, I again plotted, in 
Figure 2, the linear probabilities, but now at different 
participant ratios, with range determined from the vari-
ation in the sample.
Increasing the number of participants (as a share of 
the unemployed group and the inactive group) in core 
programmes seemed to be unrelated to the transition 
probability both among the unemployed and the inac-
tive. For peripheral programmes, increasing the num-
ber of participants seemed to decrease the transition 
probability among both the unemployed and the inac-
tive. When considering mixed programmes, the latter 
relationship was reversed, and the transition probabil-
ity instead increased with increasing participant ratios 
in both groups, although more pronounced among the 
inactive.
The content of programmes and differences across groups
Having established that core, peripheral and mixed pro-
grammes seemed to be related to transition probabilities, 
both in terms of spending and number of participants, the 
following analyses explored the differences between the 
unemployed and inactive in more detail.
Figure 2. Predicted linear probability of transitioning to employment at different participant ratios in core, peripheral and mixed 
programmes.  
Note: Marginal effects related to core programmes are not statistically different from zero. Marginal effects related to peripheral and mixed 
are statistically significant at the 95%-level.
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The first set of analyses considered the type of in-
tervention (i.e., training, employment subsidies, job 
creation programmes) in addition to the target group of 
policies. To facilitate interpretation of the results, dif-
ferences between groups were visualised in marginal 
effects plots, but now showing core, peripheral and 
mixed policies separately in Figures 3–5. I focused on 
average spending and participant ratios since results for 
median spending were very similar to average spend-
ing. The full result tables are available in the statistical 
Online Appendix, Tables A5 and A6.
Figure 3 shows the probability of transitioning 
to employment across different types of core pro-
grammes. For the unemployed, increased spending was 
associated with a higher probability of transitioning to 
employment primarily in relation to spending on job 
creation and employment subsidies, whereas estimates 
for training were not statistically significant. For the 
inactive, the effects of increased spending were sim-
ilar. However, employment subsidies and direct job 
creation seemed to dramatically increase the transition 
probability for the inactive. These two are thus the 
main drivers of the counterintuitive result between in-
active and core programmes observed in Figure 1. In 
terms of participant ratios, the unemployed seemed to 
have higher probabilities only when considering the 
scope of direct job creation, whereas the transition 
probability among the inactive seemed to increase as 
the participant ratio in direct job creation and training 
programmes increased.
Figure 4 shows the predicted probability of transition-
ing to employment, but now in regard to different types 
of peripheral policies. Increased spending and increased 
participant ratios in peripheral programmes were asso-
ciated with a decreased chance of transitioning among 
the unemployed, whereas among the inactive, spend-
ing barely seemed to affect transition rates. However, it 
seems that the inactive benefitted when the number of 
participants in peripheral training programmes was in-
creased. Overall, the marginal effects related to peripheral 
programmes were less precise, and in many cases not sta-
tistically significant at the 95%-level. This is most likely 
related to the low number of peripheral programmes.
Figure 5 shows the change in probability with re-
spect to mixed spending, i.e., policies that include both 
the unemployed and the inactive. It was mainly the in-
active who seemed to have increased chances of tran-
sitioning to employment when countries spent more 
on mixed policies, although these effects were modest. 
Associations were more pronounced when considering 
Figure 3. Predicted linear probability of transitioning to employment for different types of core programmes (average spending and 
participant ratio).  
Note: Marginal effects related to spending on core training programmes, as well as participant ratios in training and employment subsidies 
for the unemployed, are not statistically different from zero. Other marginal effects are statistically significant at the 95%-level.
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participant ratios, where the unemployed seemed to 
benefit from increasing the number of participants 
in training and employment subsidy programmes, 
whereas the probability among the inactive seemed to 
be unrelated to training programmes, and instead in-
creased as the number of participants increased in di-
rect job creation and subsidised employment.
The counterintuitive results in relation to core pro-
grammes shown in Figure 1 warrant some further in-
vestigation as the analysis might not have captured the 
effects correctly according to registered unemployed 
and registered inactive individuals. A way to test this 
was to analyse how the relationship changed if we con-
sidered benefit receipt among the inactive, which was 
available in EU-SILC. While these benefits are labelled 
as ‘unemployment benefits’, they can also include, for 
example, unemployment assistance, social assistance 
and training allowances, according to Eurostat (2010), 
and could therefore, possibly be available for the 
inactive.10 However, receiving such benefits should, in 
most countries, have been linked to registration at the 
PES, and if the inactive who received benefits were 
more likely to transition to employment, this could be 
an indication that some core programmes were mis-
classified and available for the inactive as well. As it 
was not possible to distinguish the exact type of bene-
fit, I used ‘receipt of unemployment benefits’ as a 
proxy for being registered with the PES, coded as a 
dummy for receipt of any benefits during a particular 
year.
Figure 6 shows a marginal effects calculation simi-
lar to previous figures, but limited to inactive with and 
without benefit recipiency, and to core employment 
subsidy programmes. Since increased spending on em-
ployment subsidies was found to be associated with an 
increase in transition probability mainly among inac-
tive who were receiving benefits, it might be an indica-
tion that these core programmes were in fact available 
for the inactive and, therefore, overlapped with mixed 
programmes to some degree.
A second set of analyses separated the sample by 
gender, as the descriptive statistics show that women 
were overrepresented in the sample, especially among 
the inactive. The full result table is available in the 
Online Appendix, Table A4. The effects on transition 
10 While more than half of the inactive received some type of 
‘unemployment benefit’, the average amount received by the 
inactive was much lower, about one-tenth, compared with the 
corresponding average amount received by the unemployed. 
This indicates that it was not earnings-related benefits.
Figure 4. Predicted linear probability of transitioning to employment for different types of peripheral programmes (average spending and 
participant ratio).  
Note: Marginal effects of spending on employment subsidies is not statistically significant at the 95%-level at higher levels of spending. 
Participant ratios are only statistically significant at higher levels (for both groups). There are no peripheral job creation programmes.
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probabilities related to core, peripheral and mixed 
programmes remained largely the same for men and 
women, but with some minor differences. However, 
some individual-level and macro-level variables played 
markedly different roles, where, for example, hav-
ing a family was associated with a reduced transition 
probability for women, but a higher transition proba-
bility for men. The extent to which countries spent on 
family policy seemed to primarily increase the transi-
tion probability of women, highlighting the importance 
of policies that facilitate female employment beyond 
labour market policies.
Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore the link between 
ALMPs and employment, examining whether labour 
market programmes had similar effects once we also 
considered at which target groups the programmes 
were aimed. I distinguished between spending per 
participant as well as the scope of the programmes, 
defined as number of programme participants as a 
per cent of the unemployed and of the inactive. The 
results from several multilevel models show that in-
creasing spending on core and mixed programmes 
was positively related to employment transitions 
among the unemployed, whereas the inactive seemed 
to benefit from increased spending regardless of tar-
get group of programmes. When instead consider-
ing the scope of the programmes, these conclusions 
were nuanced, as results show that increased transi-
tion probability was primarily related to the scope 
Figure 5. Predicted linear probability of transitioning to employment for different types of mixed programmes (average spending and 
participant ratio).  
Note: All marginal effects are statistically significant at the 95%-level, with the exception of participant ratios in relation to employment 
subsides and the unemployed, which is not statistically significant at the highest level.
Figure 6. Probability to transition among the inactive with and 
without cash benefit receipt at different levels of spending on 
employment subsidies.  
Note: All marginal effects are statistically significant at the 
95%-level.
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of mixed programmes. With that said, the results for 
core, peripheral and mixed policies were multifac-
eted, and suggest differences in terms of the strate-
gies that countries can pursue in an effort to increase 
employment.
Spending on core policies was, in general, asso-
ciated with increased chances to transition to em-
ployment among the unemployed, regardless of the 
type of intervention, but was also associated with 
increased employment chances among the inactive, 
with a similar pattern evident for the scope or avail-
ability of programmes. The drivers of these counter-
intuitive results seemed to depend on particular types 
of programmes. Further examination, with employ-
ment subsidies as an example, showed that there was 
a likely overlap where programmes might have been 
available for the inactive even though they were de-
scribed as being targeted towards the registered un-
employed in the policy data.
In relation to peripheral policies, spending seemed 
to be, for the most part, unrelated to the probabilities 
of transition into employment among their main target 
group, the inactive. There is some evidence for an in-
creased transition probability in respect to the scope of 
peripheral training programmes. Yet, regardless of mea-
sure, there were also indications of a trade-off, where 
results show that unemployed fared worse as spending 
or the number of participants in peripheral programmes 
increased. This could reflect that increased resources 
that are devoted solely to those farthest from the labour 
market, i.e., the inactive, come at the expense of the 
unemployed.
For mixed policies, it seems that both the unem-
ployed and the inactive have increased chances of tran-
sitioning. However, for the unemployed this seems to 
hinge more on the number of participants in training 
and employment subsidies, whereas the inactive seem 
to benefit more from both increased spending and 
availability (in terms of number of participants) in job 
creation and employment subsidies.
Implications
Taking stock of the results, what can this study 
say regarding policy implications or potential ap-
proaches that the Member States should pursue in 
order to reach the employment targets in the EU2020 
strategy? Both spending and scope of programmes 
seem to play a role in increasing the transition prob-
abilities among the unemployed and the inactive, but 
they do so differently, especially when considering 
the specific content of the policies with respect to 
training, employment subsidies and direct job crea-
tion. Increasing spending seems to be associated with 
better outcomes in relation to core programmes. This 
could reflect that targeting the registered unemployed 
is the most established way to structure labour market 
programmes in a European context. Resources are, 
therefore, not directed towards, for example, start-
up costs. In contrast, peripheral programmes are 
few and often fairly small. Consequently, the posi-
tive effects that were found are mostly linked to the 
actual number of people involved rather than spend-
ing. If providing training programmes is a priority, 
due to, for example, skill shortages in certain sec-
tors, the results here suggest that these could be 
targeted towards the inactive, but with the proviso 
that this possibly produces trade-off effects whereby 
resources are removed from the unemployed. With 
that said, the small number of programmes may also 
indicate a lack of precision in classifying peripheral 
programmes, which should be further investigated 
before drawing any firm conclusion concerning their 
potential. Mixed programmes form a middle group, 
where spending does matter for the inactive, but 
where number of participants is relevant for both 
groups. For the inactive, mixed programmes that 
focus on immediate access to jobs through job crea-
tion or subsidised employment seem to matter more. 
This partly corroborates recent research which sug-
gests that disadvantaged individuals, defined as indi-
viduals who do not receive any benefits, tend to fare 
better in ‘work-first’ programmes (e.g., job search) 
rather than in programmes that focus on human capi-
tal accumulation (Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2018).
Limitations
An important limitation of this study is that there 
was no information on actual participation in labour 
market programmes at the individual level. There is 
no such comparative information in EU-SILC and, 
as evident in the above discussion of overlapping 
core and mixed programmes, this limits the type of 
conclusion that may be drawn. The results presented 
thus offer no causal interpretation for particular in-
dividuals and should be interpreted as general asso-
ciations between patterns of policy and employment 
transitions. This limitation notwithstanding, the fact 
that associations were found provides motivation for 
further studies.
An important issue to be addressed is how the re-
sults of this study relate to the accelerating develop-
ment of labour market dualisation and precarious work 
(e.g., Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, & Seeleib-
Kaiser, 2012; Römer, 2017; Rueda, 2014). This study 
shows that countries do have programmes that cover 
inactive ‘outsiders’, i.e., individuals far from the la-
bour market, and that these programmes in many cases 
seem to have beneficial effects in terms of increasing 
employment probabilities. With that said, the long-
term effects on, for example, employment trajectories 
should be investigated further since the panel structure 
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of EU-SILC precludes any conclusions beyond short-
term effects. More importantly, increasing employ-
ment as such may not necessarily lead to more ‘active 
inclusion’, since poverty among those who work does 
not decrease at the same time (Marx et al., 2012). 
It is unlikely that participants in labour market pro-
grammes transition to permanent jobs immediately, 
but rather that they transition to jobs with temporary 
contracts. While type of contract has been argued to 
have little impact on long-run employment prospects 
(e.g., Korpi & Levin, 2001), it may still contribute to 
increases in atypical employment and transitions to 
low-quality jobs, perhaps especially in relation to sub-
sidised employment (Wulfgramm & Fervers, 2015). 
The continuing promotion of ALMPs as a way to 
achieve active inclusion would, therefore, do well to 
consider that policies such as ALMPs should be con-
structed in ways that reduce social exclusion rather 
than foster it (Biegert, 2019).
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